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**Editorial*****History teaching, pedagogy, curriculum and politics: dialogues and debates in regional, national, transnational, international and supranational settings***

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**Dynamic similarities in pedagogy, curriculum and research**

The articles collected here, in this special edition of IJHLTR (Vol. 11.2), provide evidence of some remarkable and dynamic similarities in pedagogy, curriculum and research, and in the inter-relationships of stakeholders. Examined across these contributions are not just the positive opportunities afforded by the teaching and learning of history in these settings, but also the shared problems and difficulties experienced in negotiating and reconciling curriculum research and development across the raw realities of schools and classrooms, and across the sometimes powerfully confusing pressures of central and local (macro- and micro-) politics. Indeed, in the examples given here there are often conflicting expectations among politicians, the general public, history teachers or educators, and historians, about what the purposes of history education are.

The world in its broadest sense is well-represented in the fifteen articles presented here. There are two contributions from the *Americas* (Québec, Brazil), four from *Asia* (Turkey, Israel, the Republic of Korea [South Korea], and Hong Kong), two from *Australasia* (Australia and New Zealand), and seven from *Europe* (but from eight different jurisdictions) (Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Catalonia, England, Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland, and Iceland).

Rather than take each situation separately, this editorial will summarise and synthesise in the contexts of the common themes that arise in the articles.

**Two apparently irreconcilable models of the history curriculum**

Behind much of the angst reported in the papers here, is the tension between two apparently irreconcilable models of the history curriculum: on the one hand an approach which promotes knowledge of national history and national values in the interests of preserving collective memory and fostering national identity (Lukas Perikleous reminds us in the context of this same debate in Cyprus, that Peter Seixas named this, *the best story* approach), and on the other a model based on a disciplinary focus supported by historical thinking, where the content is not dominated by the nation but has become diversified and globalised. Barton & Levstik in *Teaching History for the Common Good* (Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004) describe these as two ‘stances’: the identification stance and the analytic stance. The middle ground between these apparently irreconcilable models lies, partly at least and as will be explored below, in the discussions about criteria for the concept of ‘significance’.

**Pedagogy and politics – getting the balance right between quality and quantity**

In their article about Turkey, Gülçin and Dursun Dilek highlight a common problem of a curriculum that is so full of content ‘to be covered’ that opportunities for teachers to explore an innovating disciplinary approach, using aspects of historical thinking, are much reduced by the pressure to deliver along *quantitative* lines. In England too the current debate has involved a political commitment to return schools to a ‘back-to-basics’ history curriculum which has within it a natural tendency to measure effectiveness by *how much* is known, particularly of a two thousand year-long national narrative. This tension is also apparent in debates highlighted in Brazil by Maria Auxiliadora Schmidt, and in Australia by Tony Taylor. Indeed, Taylor describes how a ‘mile long and inch deep’ survey approach was avoided in Australia.

On the other hand, in contrast to this predominantly quantitative approach there are strong pedagogical arguments in favour of a set of underpinning *qualitative* principles which counterbalance a drive towards ‘mere’ coverage. These focus on different ways of understanding and different approaches to history involving active and experiential learning, including inquiry, dialogue, discussion and a variety of forms

of reconstruction. The heated debate in the media in England is often about ways of constructing knowledge and understanding, and how appropriate they are, including recently whether it is valid to stimulate interest by using comic cartoon films or basing lessons on well-known characters in children's books. Also pedagogy can offer experience of organisational devices that can be structured into the curriculum, such as has happened in Australia but which have been seen across the world, including such mechanisms as overviews and depth studies, core and choice. Examples of organizational, discipline-based structures being used in Australia are given on pages 12 and 13. Similarly it is useful to think of content in terms not only of 'contextual frames' but also of scaffolding. Spiralling is another concept that can link quantity to quality whether it involves returning a later stage of development to a topic examined before, or if it means a spiralled use of discipline-based historical thinking with situations and related sources chosen for their age-appropriateness. The problem of what periods of history are best for different age-groups to study is a difficult one, and it might be advisable for those responsible for curriculum design to be aware of the dangers of allocating earlier periods only to the youngest children and more recent ones to the oldest. A balance may well be a sensible policy, despite its departure from the notion of a sequential, chronological syllabus.

Quality has another aspect that has an impact on quantity, and that is in the work of historians to promote excellence in standards of historical writing and research. It is clearly important to foster a relationship between those who teach history in schools, not only with those who specialize in it at university level, but also with those who may be outside institutional academic life who write books which explore and investigate aspects of the past using a disciplinary and scholarly approach. This would include at a local level all involved in different aspects of historical enquiry, including local history societies, museums, art galleries, archives, libraries and 'heritage' (site) providers and managers, all working together for the benefit of schools, perhaps using professionals with local knowledge (like architects to explain buildings).

Nevertheless there are further aspects of 'quantity' that remain important in any debate about school history, particularly dimensions that relate to the *amount of time* allowed within schools for the teaching of history, and, importantly the school years across which history is compulsory. In England history stops at 14, whereas in Australia it continues to 16. The article by Yosanne Vella about Malta shows how time for history can be reduced if curricular parameters and priorities change to reduce history's status.

It would be true to say that 'history wars' are often about getting the relationship right between quantity and quality. One aspect of quantity is about location – how much local, national, regional and global history is embedded into a curriculum. To have no national or regional history could be regarded as being just as wrong as having no international history. It is particularly about *how much* national and how the national should be handled, particularly with what perspectives (political, economic, social and cultural, etc), and indeed what proportions of those elements should contribute to an overall scheme. There can however be problems in negotiating a professional relationship between governments, teachers and historians.

### **Historians and politicians – promoting and questioning the landmarks**

Indeed, the relationship between the body politic and historians, glimpsed with such intensity in the example provided by the English case, has also been a feature elsewhere, not least in Israel as described by Tsafirir Goldberg and David Gerwin, but also in Catalonia, Malta, Iceland, Brazil and Turkey. In an *Ha'aretz Israeli Daily* article by Or Kashti, highlighted by Goldberg and Gerwin, Professor Hanna Jablonka, senior historian and chairman of the professional history group at the Ministry of Education in Israel, dared to suggest that there were problems about the way the Holocaust was being taught ('Prof. Jablonka: — Apart from 'pornography of evil', learning the technical details of the Holocaust has no educational value', 22 March, 2010). Set against this (Goldberg and Gerwin also noted), in relation to the teaching of the Holocaust, that Arabs living in Israel were expected to learn about the Holocaust, but not about the *Nakba* [or *Naqba*] (for the Palestinians Nakba Day [from Arabic *Yawm an-Nakba*, meaning 'Day of the Catastrophe'] on 15 May, is an annual day of commemoration of the displacement that preceded and followed the Israeli Declaration of Independence in 1948).

Historians were also involved in controversies affecting the aspirations of the Catalans to achieve

autonomy. The way history was taught in Catalonia came to be influenced by a small group of historians, radical but perceptive, owing much to the influence of the Annales school. However there emerged a strongly felt interpretational debate, in which Jaume Vives Vicens challenged Ferran Soldevila, and by so doing encouraged more self-awareness about internal conflicts (social and economic) in Catalonia, moving away from a position where all blame was apportioned to Madrid or Castile.

In Turkey, according to Gülçin and Dursun Dilek, academics Kenan Çayır and Mithat Sancar have both addressed the issue of 'getting even with the past'. Gülçin and Dursun comment on Çayır's recommendation that, '... it is necessary to bring sensitive and conflict-related topics into the classroom and discuss them. But teachers do not feel sufficiently educated to do that. He suggests that more field-studies should be undertaken in order to prepare education materials for teaching the sensitive and conflict-connected topics whose importance he emphasized for a democratic and pluralist education'. Similarly, Sancar suggests that, '... in spite of a belief that our history might be full of glory and honour, goodness and fairness, it is necessary to develop a language that respects the pains of victims of the savage and dark sides of our past. In this perspective, he suggests that historiography, history education and textbooks should be revised'.

In England, Michael Gove, the Secretary of State for Education chose two celebrity historians who were well-known for their television programmes to help him write the history curriculum: Simon Schama and Niall Ferguson. However, another historian, Richard J. Evans supplied a parallel counter-narrative to these developments, contributing an impressive corpus of journalistic combativeness to the debate. He was slightly outside this charmed inner circle, but nevertheless in two coveted and prestigious academic positions at the University of Cambridge, being simultaneously Regius Professor of History and President of Wolfson Hall. Like La Trobe University historian John Hirst who had been a key player in the curriculum debate in Australia, Evans was or would be supplying the *questions* to the canon of *landmarks*.

After a very long gestation period (altogether from when the Coalition Government took office in May 2010 to February 2013, 3 months short of 3 years) the new English history curriculum, but still in its draft form, finally appeared, and reactions were, to say the least, mixed, falling along predicable lines, roughly corresponding to two different models of history teaching and at least two different schools of British history narrative, but also reflecting deeper attitudes to quantity and quality. Richard J. Evans felt justified in venting his historiographical ire in order to bring the other historians (although mainly Ferguson), and the hapless minister, Mr Gove, to account.

### **Citizenship and democracy**

The political issues latent in interpretations of citizenship have some significance in global debates about the history curriculum, especially as both history and citizenship concern themselves with aspects of political theory and indeed political action, either historically or as a force in present day politics, and particularly notions of democracy. Democracy as experienced in what can broadly be called 'the West' (although 'the West' is a problematic construct), includes much that relates to the study of history, including certain cherished freedoms of access and expression, particularly access to the historical record (archives, libraries, museums, etc.), the freedom of historians to publish, broadcast and discuss their findings, and the freedom of teachers to teach different versions of history based on records of the past. The articles about both Malta and Hong Kong clearly show the strength of local feeling about wanting to defend the study of history against imposed constructs of citizenship.

Into this mix must go the whole debate about the relationship between history education and citizenship education, and the extent to which governments are seeking to use school history in order to centralise or decentralise – centralising to enforce a uniform or politicised view of the nation (and of the citizen within that structure), or – by contrast – decentralising to encourage regions or localities (some of which may already regard themselves as nations in their own right, or may aspire to independence and actual nationhood) to develop their own distinctive histories and identities, not necessarily to the exclusion of other histories, but perhaps alongside those of their neighbours, and those of peoples who have lived

even further afield. There is of course a danger in this, in that a multiplicity of microhistories may neglect some bigger events, further afield, of *significance*, which affect the local picture.

### **First nation peoples, plural identities and cosmopolitanism**

Across this debate is another which recognises that the world has become cosmopolitan: that people travel across oceans, nations and continents – for leisure, business or profession, life-style choice, or just economic or even political necessity; that people now communicate with speed and immediacy within ever expanding social media networks (that clearly includes Hong Kong in the example given here). This diversity and cosmopolitanism applies within nations, where plural identities make it more problematic to define a unifying narrative, unless the narrative itself can be stretched to respond to a multiplicity of human experiences. Negotiating appropriate juxtapositions of the Indigenous and settler narratives has caused difficulties in New Zealand and Australia. Sometimes settlers have been interpreted as ‘invaders’, or the narratives recontextualised, as contrasting accounts of settler ‘settlement’ and Indigenous ‘unsettlement’. Within both New Zealand and Australia (and indeed Canada) there are regions where the ‘first nation’ citizens continue to see themselves as belonging to an original concept of nation which may well fall outside that strictly defined as such by governments in Wellington or Canberra (or Ottawa). However, as has been noted, it might be possible to see this as an example of the growth of hybrid or plural identities. Indeed, some governments are beginning to recognise that it might be politic to allow such autonomous community structures to co-exist alongside the more formal modern or central state as a viable set of alternatives, and to enshrine this in law, even in the Constitution. The sense of belonging which may be lost or undermined as a result of marginalisation is well explored by Stéphane Levesque, Jocelyn Létourneau and Raphaël Gani in their analysis of students’ experience in Québec, just as it is by Antoni Santisteban Fernández in his article about Catalonia.

Levesque, Létourneau and Gani argue that ‘Social Identity Theory (SIT) is important to the study of historical consciousness because it provides a critical lens for looking into the categorization process of narrating the history of the nation’. In the context of Francophone students in Québec, they examine the role of history as ‘a vital part of one’s own ingroup, the way one categorizes the past can tell us something about how he or she establishes a foundation for defining personal and collective identity’. We see how ‘young Québécois categorize actors and events into dichotomous or harmonious groupings and, as a corollary, structure their narration of Québec’s history’. There is certainly here in this categorizing pattern a strong sense of collective victimhood which seems to persist and draws a great deal of power and significance from the iconic event of 1759. This is very similar to the psychology experienced in Catalonia (a definite ingroup and outgroup identification has occurred here) and undoubtedly within Israel as described by Goldberg and Gerwin.

The tension between the Hong Kong government and protesters against the introduction of Moral and National Education [MNE] as a mandatory subject (so well described by Zardas Lee, Phoebe Tang and Carol Tsang) is about which narratives of Chinese and Hong Kong history can be taught. This is also a story of public reaction to a partial interpretation of history. Members of the public believe that MNE might limit Hong Kong’s flexibility to define and perform their cultural and national identity, because they fear that the subject would focus on China’s successes and avoid its problems. The case of Hong Kong shows the strength of feeling among young people there about how their own values and identity as Hong Kong citizens are linked to cherished freedoms, including freedom of access to a fuller version of Chinese history in which Hong Kong’s own history is not seen only through a politicised lens.

Sometimes of course there can be deep tensions between these centrifugal or centripetal forces – as can be seen especially in the articles about Catalonia, Quebec and Cyprus: Catalonia’s relationship with Spain/Madrid, Quebec’s with Ottawa and the rest of Canada, and Cyprus’s with Greece/Athens. There are clearly issues here about control, particularly where there are dominant central governments and autonomous regions.

### **The legacies of past conflicts – internal or between neighbours**

The legacies of past conflicts can act as barriers to transnational understanding, and it is encouraging

to note within the articles about Turkey (Gülçin and Dursun Dilek) and the Republic of Korea (Sun Joo Kang) that there are moves to write common histories collaboratively as shared experiences across national frontiers, for example the history of the Ottoman Empire (experienced by many Arabian countries). Sun Joo Kang describes how territorial disputes between the Republic of Korea (South Korea), China, and Japan have had historiographical implications as well as considerable impact on the current history curriculum in, evoking intensified nationalistic perspectives in each country. She describes how, in order to ease the tension among the three countries, historians from the three countries have collaborated in writing a book on the modern history of East Asia (*Han Joog Il Gong dong Yuk sa Pyun chan Uiwon Hwai*, [The Committee on Korean, Chinese, and Japanese Collaborative Writing of East Asian History], 2007). She writes, '... although this book has not been widely read, scholars and educators anticipate that continuing efforts to build a consensus on a common past among the three countries will narrow historiographical and political gaps and reduce or eliminate conflicts'.

In their article, 'A question of identity? Purpose, policy and practice in the teaching of history in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland', Alan McCully and Fionnuala Waldron achieve a remarkable set of parallel commentaries on curriculum developments in history before and after partition and during and after 'the Troubles' in Northern Ireland which had an effect on both sides of the border. What emerges is a paradigm for reducing conflict in societies where identity-related politics had been fed by partisan interpretations of history. With analogous developments in history-related pedagogy which welcomed the multi-perspectivity and critical enquiry that went hand-in-hand with postmodern and postcolonial interpretations of history, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland embraced plurality with a much greater tolerance of difference. However, some differences remain, significantly in Northern Ireland's reluctance to teach political history to younger age-groups. Nevertheless, research in the field (e.g. by Keith Barton and Alan McCully) has pointed to the ability even of primary students to bring a surprisingly sophisticated understanding to the political dimensions of Northern Ireland's and Ireland's histories.

### **Regional and supranational re-alignments on small and large scales**

The European Union features in some of these papers, and in Danijela Trskan's article the EU plays a part in the re-shaping of Slovenia's history curriculum where its influence can be seen in sharp contradistinction to the old 'communist bloc' alignments of the Cold War. Clear evidence of impact of the EU is in a move away from Slovenia being seen mainly as part of Yugoslavia but in its transformation to being part of a wider and transnational Europe. As a result, the history curriculum itself places Slovenia in a wider setting with its centre more to the north and west than as it had been in the past when its centre had been both to the south and to the east.

Somewhat differently, Catalonia, while still in the dying days of the Franco regime in the early 1970s, felt the effect of Madrid's drive to rewrite Spanish history in order to present the trajectory of the Spanish past as being part of a pan-European project right up to the present. Indeed, the composite monarchies at the time of Charles V and Philip II had a trans-European feel to them. However, this kind of anachronism was a form of wishful thinking that did not entirely convince, especially locally in Catalonia and in Spain's other autonomous regions, mainly because of the as yet unresolved legacies of the Spanish Civil War. Turkey is taking the possibility of its future membership of the EU very seriously. It would however be unfair to compare the situation in Turkey now with Spain in the early 1970s, especially as there seems to have been a genuine shift both in pedagogy and historiography – which definitely had not happened in Franco's Spain. The Council of Europe criteria so carefully described by Gülçin Dilek and Dursun Dilek are having an impact on the study of the past and elide with moves already being initiated to find ways of teaching a common past (e.g. the Ottoman Empire) across national boundaries, thus reducing the potential for using the past to feed continuing conflicts.

It is interesting to take the history curriculum situation inside Cyprus as described by Lukas Perikleous as evidence of tension between two narrative models – *Hellenocentric* and *Cyprocentric*, indeed not unlike the situation as seen in Israel (according to Tsafirir Goldberg and David Gerwin) who describe an ongoing liberal-conservative pendulum. The essence of the Cyprocentric model, which at the moment challenges the dominant Hellenocentric one, is that it has a great deal in common with the new Turkish

model. It is about understanding rather than blaming or labeling, and it is about history teaching and learning having an eirenic purpose, i.e. for peace rather than conflict.

### **The nature of the narrative**

One point of contention is the nature of the narrative itself, who peoples it, and what focus it might take. Politicians, partly because politics is their business, tend to favour a narrative that is dominated by political and quite often military events or landmarks. This was noted by Antoni Santisteban Fernández in Catalonia, and has certainly been a temptation for Michael Gove in England. But a narrative does not have to be mainly political. It can include the social, the economic and indeed the cultural, religious, scientific and technological. A narrative can and clearly should include women and children as well as men. It also has the potential to embrace the histories of other socio-economic groups to supplement or counter-balance the inevitable ruling classes. A narrative can use local examples to illustrate the national. However, as has been seen in the case of Northern Ireland it is important not to neglect political history in order to protect younger children from the possibility of being tainted by partisan identity politics. If explanation rather than anachronistic celebration is at the heart of history learning and teaching, then the dangers of politicising school history can be avoided.

Neither does a narrative have to be 'ethnocentric', although this label needs to be unpacked. It would be correctly used if it meant an exclusive focus on the story of a particular (or majority) ethnic population of the nation, although – and more problematically – it is sometimes used just to mean the centrality supplied by an exclusively national focus, even though that focus may include plural identities. In which case Anglocentric – as an example of a focus on the history of a nation, namely England – although implying a certain narrowness of focus (i.e. English rather than British), does not necessarily also mean ethnocentric, particularly in the 21st century, given England's diversity. Such a diversity was also seen as a feature of Catalonia's history, and this plurality together with the sense of Catalonia being (like other parts of the world discussed in this journal-edition) a place of 'passage', has acted as a counterbalance to those wanting a less enlightened form of Catalan nationalism or Catalanism.

### **Significance**

In seeking to find a middle way between a mainly national approach and one characterised by history as a discipline, it is necessary to unpack some of the component parts of the most influential envelope into which these concepts have been placed, which is probably Peter Seixas's six 'benchmarks for historical thinking' (Establish historical significance, Use primary source evidence, Identify continuity and change, Analyze cause and consequence, Take historical perspectives and Understand ethical dimensions of history). As Mark Sheehan has pointed out in his New Zealand case study, there can be constructive links between 'national' events and international events in which (national) citizens took part, especially when examining which events and developments in the past have been significant. It would be interesting to debate the extent to which there is a relationship between significance (or criteria for the selection of significant events or developments) and metanarrative.

Nevertheless, significance, although it can be appropriated by politicians for the nation (and, it could be argued, understandably so, but with some caveats) is a factor which is played out on stages and in arenas which are not just national, but are also local, regional, international and transnational. Gallipoli, for example, as a military event with significance [from 25 April 1915 to 9 January 1916, during the First World War], is not just about the role of the Anzacs (from New Zealand and Australia, as well as all of their dependencies) but affects, or is affected by, the histories of many European countries, and – of course – by the history of the Turks and the Ottoman Empire. As Stéphane Lévesque, Jocelyn Létourneau and Raphaël Gani, have pointed out, the loss of French Québec to 'les Anglais' (*bataille des plaines d'Abraham* or *première bataille de Québec*) in 1759, was not just a local event with significance for les Québécois, but was a battle linked to a wider war (the Seven Years War, *La Guerre des Sept Ans*) with global significance affecting many nations and peoples, although acutely felt, and with long-term consequences, in Québec.

Interestingly, J.H.Elliott, who was born in 1930, in his recent reflection on a long life as an historian, *History in the Making* (Yale, 2012) (especially Chapter 2, 'National and transnational history', pp. 40-79), and using many examples from his researches into the histories of Catalonia and Spain, makes a strong case for an alliance of national and transnational history, not least because the transnational throws a fresh and comprehending light on the national. However, Sun Joo Kang mentions the writings, in a similar vein, of Peter Stearns, but points out that over-internationalising the history of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) might reduce its national history to a position of relative insignificance, rather problematically.

### **The media**

The role of the media in history curriculum debates can be seen in sharp focus in the articles about Australia, Israel and England. We also see in these pages that history teacher educators, including those contributing to these pages, have been willing *themselves* to go to the media to express strong views about developments in history education. We see this for Malta as well as the others mentioned above. Newspapers tend to occupy determinable, predictable political positions, but are also predisposed to simplify or polarise the stances of the players, indeed as David Cannadine suggested, to 'irreconcilable simplicities'.

Tony Taylor is right to juxtapose, in the title of his piece, *politics* and *professionalism*, because politicians, in their drive to impose a party-political model of the history curriculum on schools, are often egged on by the press. With the press possibly therefore suspecting the professionals themselves of having political agendas, politicians have a tendency to over-ride or ignore the professional concerns of historians, history teacher educators and teachers of history. Taylor provides an example of where the good sense of professionals involved in the construction of Australia's history curriculum held on to professional commonsense to frame a curriculum that was teachable. Australia had adopted a model that owed a great deal to the 'disciplinary' principles of Peter Seixas, and, in a workable compromise had retained national history but in a global and transnational setting across a largely sequential set of chronologies that would not have been unfamiliar to those favouring a more traditional approach. Yosanne Vella demonstrates that going public on her deep concerns over the future of history in Malta's schools paid dividends in that notice was eventually taken.

### **What young people know – and how they know it**

Many of the nations, aspiring nations or autonomous regions represented in these papers give examples of politicians, often encouraged by agitating sectors of the media, deploring the lack of traditional historical knowledge among young people. An example of this, described by Súsanna Margrét Gestsdóttir was a prime minister of Iceland who was shocked that students visiting his official residence were unable to name former prime ministers.

Despite having history education cut back at various stages, once in order to incorporate it within Social Studies, Icelandic students did remarkably well in analysing sources in a joint project with Portugal. Like many other places (e.g. Turkey, Israel, the Republic of Korea) Iceland has suffered from over-dependence on textbooks, and the textbook market has been slow to change, especially to incorporate new approaches to history. In common with other experiences described in these articles there is a move away from seeing history as merely there to reinforce a national heroic myth about the continuation of an ethnocentric way of life that goes back to the sagas. An increase in the development of historical consciousness in schools also reflects a move to a more pluralistic approach which embeds a democratic and inclusive way of life.

As Maria Auxiliadora Schmidt explains in her article on Brazil, there is a need to understand the difference between teachers' knowledge and the pupils' or students' knowledge (*saber escolar* in Portuguese). She writes, 'The process of internationalization and the rites of passage by which historical consciousness can be developed are important factors and will undoubtedly be different within the range of school age-groups. However, in the 21st century, attempts at a reconstruction of the history disciplinary code have been taken, not only in Brazil, but also in different countries, and this can be seen in debates and proposals which, dialogically, try to establish articulations and more organic

networks linking the dimensions of historical culture and scholar (school) culture, not in an instrumental sense, but in a perspective that will prove to be more emancipating'. A more organic underpinning of the relationships between politicians, historians and teachers would certainly be a recommendation which would benefit history teaching in many countries.

There does seem to be a continuing problem however, which has been noted by Sun Joo Kang (on the Republic of Korea) and by Gülçin and Dursun Dilek (Turkey) that there is sometimes just not enough time to bring a critically evaluative approach to these long lists which represent canons of collective memory. Landmarks only become valid within history education, as has been seen, when they are accompanied by critical enquiry – indeed by questions.

### **Schemes which subsume history in other subjects (Social Studies and Citizenship)**

In some of these articles (e.g. Malta by Yosanne Vella) either citizenship studies or social studies have been seen, often with some justification, as being a threat to the time allowed for history, or even as a threat to the very existence of history as a distinct subject in its own right.

In Malta, Yosanne Vella points out the intervention of historian Henry Frendo (*Times of Malta*, 27 March, 2009) who reacted in this way when hearing rumours that history was to be part of integrated studies: 'But what is now in store for the rising generation is very probably greater illiteracy in so far as Maltese history goes – an ignorance as to who and what Malta and the Maltese are or have become; the shared past that has seen Malta and the Maltese emerge as a people, a nation and a state. Without a sense of nationality and nationhood based on an empirical non-dogmatic account of past times, especially the last few centuries, there can be little self-identity, self-esteem, affinity, communion, motivation or aspiration or, indeed, critical appreciation or understanding, in any 'national' sense'.

As in other countries the New History approach was encouraged by historians, and in the case of Malta by Michael Sant who built source work into public examinations. Thus there were two strands – a vigorous fight to keep history in the curriculum, appealing to what would be lost to future Maltese citizens, and on the other a reform of history teaching itself. After much lobbying and fighting in the press, in the end in Malta history did not have to be squeezed into a minimum amount of time within citizenship studies and was retained as a subject.

Nevertheless, in some successful examples given in these articles, and where history has been under less threat than in Malta, without losing its integrity, and demonstrating a more effective model than being a small (and slowly disappearing part of citizenship studies) – history has been effectively *combined* with aspects of citizenship, especially where both content focuses *and* associated procedural approaches have reflected critical enquiry as well as democratic inclusiveness and plurality.

### **Conclusions: transnational debates and transnational action in learning, teaching and research**

There seems to be a growing consensus about what makes for a good history education across the world. This includes getting the balance right between quantity and quality, an increasingly eirenic (peace-oriented) approach to neighbours, setting aside a tendency to stress old conflicts, and a growing use of the critical tools of historical thinking when approaching content, whether the contextual frames are local, national or international.

David Cannadine ended his just published *The Undivided Past – History beyond our Differences* (Allen Lane, 2013) with this paragraph (p. 264):

... the history of humankind is at least as much about cooperation as it is about conflict, and about kindness to strangers as about the obsession with otherness and alterity. To write about the past no less than to live in the present, we need to see beyond our differences, our sectional interests, our identity politics, and our parochial concerns to embrace and to celebrate the common humanity that has always bound us together, that still binds us together today, and that will continue to bind us together in the future.